Nigeria’s debate over policing reform has entered a potentially consequential phase. The Presidential Working Group on the National Policing Bill has submitted the Draft National Policing Bill 2026, together with twenty-nine consequential amendment bills, to the Federal Ministry of Justice for legislative-drafting review.
According to the official announcement, the proposal seeks to establish a dual policing structure comprising a Federal Police Service and State Police Services. After legal validation and further consideration, the proposal is expected to proceed to the President and, subsequently, the National Assembly.
This is therefore not yet an enacted law. Nor should the announcement be treated as evidence that the difficult constitutional and institutional questions surrounding state policing have been resolved.
Why reform is understandable
The case for reconsidering Nigeria’s highly centralised policing system is compelling. Communities face different security conditions, yet operational decisions are often taken through a national command structure that may be distant from local realities.
Properly designed state police services could improve local intelligence, response times, community engagement and accountability. State institutions may be better positioned to understand local languages, geography, social relationships and emerging threats.
However, decentralisation is not automatically the same as reform. Transferring coercive authority from the Federal Government to state governments without strong safeguards could merely relocate existing problems.
The central question is therefore not simply whether Nigeria should establish state police. It is what constitutional, financial and accountability architecture should govern them.
The danger of political capture
The most frequently expressed concern is that state police services could be captured by governors or ruling political interests.
Without institutional independence, a state police service could be used to intimidate political opponents, interfere with elections, suppress lawful protest or target journalists and civil-society organisations. These risks are particularly serious where legislatures, oversight bodies and public institutions lack sufficient independence from the executive.
The eventual legislation must therefore protect operational policing decisions from improper political direction. Appointment and removal procedures for senior officers should be transparent, merit-based and subject to independent scrutiny. State policing authorities should not function as personal security structures of incumbent governors.
Jurisdiction must be unambiguous
A dual system will also require clear rules governing the respective responsibilities of federal and state police services.
The law should specify who investigates crimes spanning more than one state, terrorism, cybercrime, organised crime, attacks on federal institutions and offences involving state officials. It should establish procedures for transferring investigations, sharing intelligence, preserving evidence and resolving jurisdictional disputes.
Without such clarity, concurrent operations may produce duplication, competition, gaps in responsibility or politically motivated interference with investigations.
A permanent coordination mechanism will be necessary, but coordination should not become a device through which one tier routinely overrides the lawful authority of another.
Unequal financial capacity
State policing also raises an important question of equality. Some states can finance recruitment, training, equipment, forensic services and professional remuneration more easily than others.
A system that produces well-resourced police services in wealthier states and poorly trained, irregularly paid officers elsewhere could deepen regional inequality and create new security vulnerabilities.
The funding framework must therefore include minimum national standards and a transparent equalisation mechanism. Police services should not depend on informal levies, political donations or opaque security-vote arrangements. Their budgets and audited expenditure should be open to legislative and public scrutiny.
Rights and accountability must come first
A new policing structure should not be judged merely by how many officers are recruited or commands established. Its legitimacy will depend on whether it protects citizens from both crime and official abuse.
The legislation should provide for:
- independent complaints and investigation bodies;
- enforceable rules on arrest, detention and the use of force;
- accessible remedies for victims of unlawful policing;
- mandatory reporting of deaths, injuries and serious complaints;
- protection for whistle-blowers;
- transparent disciplinary procedures;
- judicial oversight; and
- regular publication of performance and human-rights data.
Community oversight bodies must also be genuinely representative and institutionally independent. They should not become ceremonial committees dominated by political appointees.
Professional standards cannot be fragmented
Although policing may be decentralised, basic professional standards should remain nationally consistent.
Recruitment, vetting, training, promotion, firearms control, evidence handling, forensic practice and data protection should satisfy common minimum requirements. Officers should receive adequate remuneration and continuing professional education.
Interoperable criminal-information systems will also be essential. Yet interoperability must be accompanied by strong privacy, cybersecurity and access-control safeguards. A decentralised police structure should not create an uncontrolled network of databases vulnerable to political misuse or unauthorised surveillance.
A reform that requires public scrutiny
The submission of one principal bill and twenty-nine consequential amendment bills demonstrates that this is not a minor administrative adjustment. It is a restructuring of constitutional authority and state power.
For that reason, the complete draft texts should be published before legislative consideration. Citizens, security professionals, state governments, lawyers, human-rights organisations, traditional institutions and affected communities should have a meaningful opportunity to examine and comment on them.
Consultation should occur before institutional positions harden—not after the essential policy choices have already become irreversible.
Final reflection
Nigeria needs policing that is responsive to local realities. But proximity without accountability may simply bring coercive power closer to the citizen.
The success of the proposed reform will therefore depend less on the labels “federal” and “state” than on the safeguards governing independence, funding, jurisdiction, professional competence, transparency and remedies for abuse.
A dual policing system could strengthen Nigerian federalism and improve public security. It could also multiply political interference, institutional rivalry and human-rights violations if established without adequate restraints.
The Draft National Policing Bill should be approached as an opportunity to redesign policing around constitutionalism—not merely to redistribute police commands.
Source: The State House, Presidential Working Group Submits Draft National Policing Bill 2026 and 29 Consequential Amendment Bills for Legislative Drafting Review ↗, 20 October 2026.
Important: This commentary is based on the official government announcement available at the time of writing. It does not purport to analyse provisions of the Draft Bill that have not yet been publicly examined, and it is not legal advice.
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